--- /dev/null
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
+
+ Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix
+
+ Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
+ Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.
+
+ Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a
+ fencepost error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met
+ only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly
+ greater than the supermajority ratio.
+
+ In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
+ developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
+ dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
+ dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that
+ is no longer possible.
+
+ This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
+ of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
+
+ Additionally, following discussion of the supermajority mechanism
+ within the project, it was realised that certain situations could
+ cause anomalous results:
+
+ * The existing rules might result in a GR or TC resolution passing
+ which was actually the diametric opposite of the majority view.
+
+ * The existing rules unintentionally privilege the default option
+ in evenly contested TC votes where no supermajority is required,
+ possibly encouraging tactical voting.
+
+ Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows:
+
+ (i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
+ by dropping options at an early stage). Specifically:
+ - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
+ A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
+ - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
+ followed by A.6(4).
+
+ (ii) In A.6(8) replace all occurrences of "winner" with
+ "prospective winner". Replace "wins" in "which of those options
+ wins" with "is the prospective winner".
+
+ (iii) In A.6(8) add a new sentence at the end:
+ + If there is no elector with a casting vote, the default option
+ + wins.
+
+ (iv) Add a new section A.6(9) after A.6(8):
+ + 9. 1. If the prospective winner W has no majority requirement,
+ + or defeats the default option D by its majority
+ + requirement, the prospective winner is the actual winner.
+ + 2. Otherwise, the motion has failed its supermajority with
+ + the consequences set out alongside the majority
+ + requirement (or, if unspecified, the default option
+ + wins).
+ + 3. An option A defeats the default option D by a
+ + majority of N:M if M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to
+ + N * V(D,A).
+
+ (v) In
+ * 6.1(4) (Technical Commitee power to overrule a Developer)
+ * 4.1(4) (Developers' use of TC powers by GR) (if another
+ constitutional amendment has not abolished that
+ supermajority requirement)
+ in each case after the "N:M majority" add
+ + ; failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes
+ + a non-binding statement of opinion.
+
+ (vi) In A.3(2) delete as follows:
+ 2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
+ - Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
+ - have a 1:1 majority requirement.
+
+ For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
+ votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
+ Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
+
+ The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and arrange that failing a
+ supermajority voids the whole decision (or makes it advisory),
+ rather than promoting another option. The fencepost bugfix will
+ also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions
+ requiring supermajorities. And after this change the TC chair can
+ choose a non-default option even if it is tied with a default
+ option.
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
projects / debian-ctte.git / blobdiff