From: Ian Jackson Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 13:03:14 +0000 (+0100) Subject: 636783_supermajority: rename files to be less confusing X-Git-Url: https://git.donarmstrong.com/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=5a6d5504509ac999083e5091b52ff1cc5547077f;p=debian-ctte.git 636783_supermajority: rename files to be less confusing --- diff --git a/636783_supermajority/amend-propose b/636783_supermajority/amend-propose deleted file mode 100644 index 5682097..0000000 --- a/636783_supermajority/amend-propose +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ - -2. It is not practical for the TC to vote to accept/reject individual - amendments to the GR proposal. The TC would wish to delegate its - power to accept amendments, to avoid needing the collection of - sponsors for uncontroversial changes. However the Secretary has - advised that this is not constitutionally acceptable. - - Therefore, to achieve roughly the same effect, the TC makes the - following promise. If any TC member gives notice that the TC - accepts an amendment, then at least one of the following will - happen: - - (a) the TC will use its own power under A.1(1) to arrange that - the amendment appears on the GR ballot as an option; - - (b) the TC will use its power under A.1(1) to propose and - its power under A.1(2) to accept the amendment, so that - the amendment is incorporated in the version voted on; or - - (c) A member of the TC will publicly notify the amendment's - proposer that the amendment will not be accepted after all. - In this case TC will wait at least 7 more days before calling - for a vote, to give time for the amendment's proposer to - collect sponsors. - -===== TC RESOLUTION ENDS ===== diff --git a/636783_supermajority/informal-propose b/636783_supermajority/informal-propose deleted file mode 100644 index 89527f6..0000000 --- a/636783_supermajority/informal-propose +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -===== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===== - -1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in - 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following - General Resolution: - - ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS ----- - - Constitutional Amendment: Permit TC to hold informal private conversations - - On a number of occasions recently, enquirers have emailed TC - members' personal addreses to informally seek members' views. This - has worked well; however it is not clear that Constitution permits - it. This situation should be regularised. - - On occasion the TC has been asked to decide on maintainership of - packages. It is very difficult to hold the necessary discussions, - which inevitably involve discussion of personalities, in public. - - At the moment the TC is unable to take on a mediation role, since - mediation necessarily involves each party to a dispute conversing - privately with the mediator. The TC should be able to mediate if - the TC, and parties to a dispute, wish it to do so. - - Actual decisionmaking must still place in public of course. - - Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution 6.3 as follows (wdiff -i): - - 3. Public [-discussion and-] decision-making. - - [-Discussion,-] - Draft resolutions and amendments, and votes by members of the - committee, are made public on the Technical Committee public - discussion list. There is no separate secretary for the - Committee. - - [+The Technical Committee should limit private - discussions to situations where holding the conversation in - public would be infeasible or counterproductive.+] - - ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS ----- diff --git a/636783_supermajority/numberfix-propose b/636783_supermajority/numberfix-propose deleted file mode 100644 index 3397976..0000000 --- a/636783_supermajority/numberfix-propose +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -===== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===== - -1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in - 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following - General Resolution: - - ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS ----- - - Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering. - - The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1. - This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is - undesirable. - - Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment: - - - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0. - - ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS ----- diff --git a/636783_supermajority/overrule-propose b/636783_supermajority/overrule-propose deleted file mode 100644 index 631e10b..0000000 --- a/636783_supermajority/overrule-propose +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS === - -1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in 4.2(1) - of the Debian Constitution to propose a General Resolution, - and according to A.1(1) the TC also proposes an amendment. - - The proposed texts of the two resulting options for the General - Resolution are as follows: - - ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS, COMMON INTRODUCTORY TEXT ----- - - Advice to the TC on overruling maintainers - - In the past the Technical Committee have been reluctant to overrule - a maintainer unless all the members are absolutely convinced that - the maintainer's decision was wrong. - - The TC has sought the views of the Developers. Accordingly, the - Developers advise, in their (non-binding) opinion, that: - - ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION OPTION A ----- - - The Technical Committee's approach so far has been correct. - - ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION OPTION B ----- - - Technical Committee members should be willing to vote to overrule if - they feel that the maintainer's decision was wrong; the - supermajority requirement is sufficient to guard against overruling - in questionable cases. - - ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS ----- - diff --git a/636783_supermajority/propose-informal b/636783_supermajority/propose-informal new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89527f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/636783_supermajority/propose-informal @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +===== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===== + +1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in + 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following + General Resolution: + + ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS ----- + + Constitutional Amendment: Permit TC to hold informal private conversations + + On a number of occasions recently, enquirers have emailed TC + members' personal addreses to informally seek members' views. This + has worked well; however it is not clear that Constitution permits + it. This situation should be regularised. + + On occasion the TC has been asked to decide on maintainership of + packages. It is very difficult to hold the necessary discussions, + which inevitably involve discussion of personalities, in public. + + At the moment the TC is unable to take on a mediation role, since + mediation necessarily involves each party to a dispute conversing + privately with the mediator. The TC should be able to mediate if + the TC, and parties to a dispute, wish it to do so. + + Actual decisionmaking must still place in public of course. + + Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution 6.3 as follows (wdiff -i): + + 3. Public [-discussion and-] decision-making. + + [-Discussion,-] + Draft resolutions and amendments, and votes by members of the + committee, are made public on the Technical Committee public + discussion list. There is no separate secretary for the + Committee. + + [+The Technical Committee should limit private + discussions to situations where holding the conversation in + public would be infeasible or counterproductive.+] + + ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS ----- diff --git a/636783_supermajority/propose-numberfix b/636783_supermajority/propose-numberfix new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3397976 --- /dev/null +++ b/636783_supermajority/propose-numberfix @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +===== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===== + +1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in + 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following + General Resolution: + + ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS ----- + + Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering. + + The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1. + This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is + undesirable. + + Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment: + + - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0. + + ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS ----- diff --git a/636783_supermajority/propose-overrule b/636783_supermajority/propose-overrule new file mode 100644 index 0000000..631e10b --- /dev/null +++ b/636783_supermajority/propose-overrule @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS === + +1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in 4.2(1) + of the Debian Constitution to propose a General Resolution, + and according to A.1(1) the TC also proposes an amendment. + + The proposed texts of the two resulting options for the General + Resolution are as follows: + + ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS, COMMON INTRODUCTORY TEXT ----- + + Advice to the TC on overruling maintainers + + In the past the Technical Committee have been reluctant to overrule + a maintainer unless all the members are absolutely convinced that + the maintainer's decision was wrong. + + The TC has sought the views of the Developers. Accordingly, the + Developers advise, in their (non-binding) opinion, that: + + ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION OPTION A ----- + + The Technical Committee's approach so far has been correct. + + ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION OPTION B ----- + + Technical Committee members should be willing to vote to overrule if + they feel that the maintainer's decision was wrong; the + supermajority requirement is sufficient to guard against overruling + in questionable cases. + + ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS ----- + diff --git a/636783_supermajority/propose-supermajority b/636783_supermajority/propose-supermajority new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f76592 --- /dev/null +++ b/636783_supermajority/propose-supermajority @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS === + +1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in + 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following + General Resolution: + + ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS ----- + + Constitutional Amendment- TC Supermajority Fix + + Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical + Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1. + + Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a + fencepost error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met + only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly + greater than the supermajority ratio. + + In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a + developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single + dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two + dissenters could be overruled by all 6 remaining members; now that + is no longer possible. + + This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent + of the Constitution, and is unhelpful. + + Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows: + + (i) Replace "majority" with "supermajority" everywhere a ratio + other than 1:1 is specified. That is, in + 4.1(2) -- Developers' power to amend the Constitution + 4.1(4) -- Developers' power to overrule the TC + 4.1(5)(3) -- Developers' power to amend Foundation Documents + 6.1(4) -- TC's power to overrule a Developer (both occurrences) + replace the word "majority" with "supermajority". + + (ii) In A.6(3): + + 3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default + option by its required majority ratio is dropped from + consideration. + 1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters + who prefer option A over option B. + - 2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority + - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A). + - 3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority + - ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1. + + 2. An option A defeats the default option D by its + + required majority ratio if both: + + (a) V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A); and + + (b) if a supermajority of N:M is required for A, + + M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to N * V(D,A). + + (iii) In A.3(2) "Voting procedure", delete as follows: + 2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements. + - Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement + - have a 1:1 majority requirement. + + The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and make the wording + consistent, by always referring to "supermajorities" where + applicable. A 1:1 vote will need strictly more in favour than + against, but an N:1 vote will need only exactly N:1. This will + also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions + requiring supermajorities. + + For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any + votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical + Committee) in progress at the time the change is made. + + ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS ----- diff --git a/636783_supermajority/supermajority-propose b/636783_supermajority/supermajority-propose deleted file mode 100644 index 5f76592..0000000 --- a/636783_supermajority/supermajority-propose +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS === - -1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in - 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following - General Resolution: - - ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS ----- - - Constitutional Amendment- TC Supermajority Fix - - Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical - Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1. - - Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a - fencepost error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met - only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly - greater than the supermajority ratio. - - In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a - developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single - dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two - dissenters could be overruled by all 6 remaining members; now that - is no longer possible. - - This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent - of the Constitution, and is unhelpful. - - Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows: - - (i) Replace "majority" with "supermajority" everywhere a ratio - other than 1:1 is specified. That is, in - 4.1(2) -- Developers' power to amend the Constitution - 4.1(4) -- Developers' power to overrule the TC - 4.1(5)(3) -- Developers' power to amend Foundation Documents - 6.1(4) -- TC's power to overrule a Developer (both occurrences) - replace the word "majority" with "supermajority". - - (ii) In A.6(3): - - 3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default - option by its required majority ratio is dropped from - consideration. - 1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters - who prefer option A over option B. - - 2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority - - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A). - - 3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority - - ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1. - + 2. An option A defeats the default option D by its - + required majority ratio if both: - + (a) V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A); and - + (b) if a supermajority of N:M is required for A, - + M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to N * V(D,A). - - (iii) In A.3(2) "Voting procedure", delete as follows: - 2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements. - - Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement - - have a 1:1 majority requirement. - - The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and make the wording - consistent, by always referring to "supermajorities" where - applicable. A 1:1 vote will need strictly more in favour than - against, but an N:1 vote will need only exactly N:1. This will - also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions - requiring supermajorities. - - For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any - votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical - Committee) in progress at the time the change is made. - - ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS ----- diff --git a/636783_supermajority/trailer-propose-amend b/636783_supermajority/trailer-propose-amend new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5682097 --- /dev/null +++ b/636783_supermajority/trailer-propose-amend @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ + +2. It is not practical for the TC to vote to accept/reject individual + amendments to the GR proposal. The TC would wish to delegate its + power to accept amendments, to avoid needing the collection of + sponsors for uncontroversial changes. However the Secretary has + advised that this is not constitutionally acceptable. + + Therefore, to achieve roughly the same effect, the TC makes the + following promise. If any TC member gives notice that the TC + accepts an amendment, then at least one of the following will + happen: + + (a) the TC will use its own power under A.1(1) to arrange that + the amendment appears on the GR ballot as an option; + + (b) the TC will use its power under A.1(1) to propose and + its power under A.1(2) to accept the amendment, so that + the amendment is incorporated in the version voted on; or + + (c) A member of the TC will publicly notify the amendment's + proposer that the amendment will not be accepted after all. + In this case TC will wait at least 7 more days before calling + for a vote, to give time for the amendment's proposer to + collect sponsors. + +===== TC RESOLUTION ENDS =====