636783_supermajority: new text as discussed

diff --git a/636783_supermajority/propose-supermajority b/636783_supermajority/propose-supermajority
index 9555dd26b357cd5776e3dcc6780b52d4345a0e37..b5674fafc283713a9bc35f3f3399be98cd141a2c 100644 (file)
--- a/636783_supermajority/propose-supermajority
+++ b/636783_supermajority/propose-supermajority
@@ -19,53 +19,76 @@
    In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
    developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
    dissenter.  And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
-   dissenters could be overruled by all 6 remaining members; now that
+   dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that
    is no longer possible.
 
    This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
    of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
 
+   Additionally, following discussion of the supermajority mechanism
+   within the project, it was realised that certain situations could
+   cause anomalous results:
+
+   * The existing rules might result in a GR or TC resolution passing
+     which was actually the diametric opposite of the majority view.
+
+   * The existing rules unintentionally privilege the default option
+     in evenly contested TC votes where no supermajority is required,
+     possibly encouraging tactical voting.
+
    Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows:
 
-   (i) Replace "majority" with "supermajority" everywhere a ratio
-   other than 1:1 is specified.  That is, in
-      4.1(2) -- Developers' power to amend the Constitution
-      4.1(4) -- Developers' power to overrule the TC
-      4.1(5)(3) -- Developers' power to amend Foundation Documents
-      6.1(4) -- TC's power to overrule a Developer (both occurrences)
-   replace the word "majority" with "supermajority".
-
-   (ii) In A.6(3):
-
-       3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default
-          option by its required majority ratio is dropped from
-          consideration.
-           1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
-              who prefer option A over option B.
-    -      2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
-    -         ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
-    -      3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
-    -         ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
-    +      2. An option A defeats the default option D by its
-    +         required majority ratio if both:
-    +          (a) V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A); and
-    +          (b) if a supermajority of N:M is required for A,
-    +              M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to N * V(D,A).
-
-   (iii) In A.3(2) "Voting procedure", delete as follows:
-        2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
-    -       Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
-    -       have a 1:1 majority requirement.
+   (i) Delete most of A.6(3) (which implemented the supermajority
+   by dropping options at an early stage).  Specifically:
+      - Move A.6(3)(1) (the definition of V(A,B)) to a new subparagraph
+        A.6(3)(0) before A.6(3)(1).
+      - Remove the rest of A.6(3) entirely, leaving A.6(2) to be
+        followed by A.6(4).
 
-   The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and make the wording
-   consistent, by always referring to "supermajorities" where
-   applicable.  A 1:1 vote will need strictly more in favour than
-   against, but an N:1 vote will need only exactly N:1.  This will
-   also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions
-   requiring supermajorities.
+   (ii) In A.6(8) replace all occurrences of "winner" with
+   "prospective winner".  Replace "wins" in "which of those options
+   wins" with "is the prospective winner".
+
+   (iii) In A.6(8) add a new sentence at the end:
+     + If there is no elector with a casting vote, the default option
+     + wins.
+
+   (iv) Add a new section A.6(9) after A.6(8):
+     + 9. 1. If the prospective winner W has no majority requirement,
+     +       or defeats the default option D by its majority
+     +       requirement, the prospective winner is the actual winner.
+     +    2. Otherwise, the motion has failed its supermajority with
+     +       the consequences set out alongside the majority
+     +       requirement (or, if unspecified, the default option
+     +       wins).
+     +    3. An option A defeats the default option D by a
+     +       majority of N:M if M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to
+     +       N * V(D,A).
+
+   (v) In
+       * 6.1(4) (Technical Commitee power to overrule a Developer)
+       * 4.1(4) (Developers' use of TC powers by GR) (if another
+           constitutional amendment has not abolished that
+           supermajority requirement)
+   in each case after the "N:M majority" add
+     +   ; failing that, the prospective winning resolution text becomes
+     +   a non-binding statement of opinion.
+
+   (vi) In A.3(2) delete as follows:
+        2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
+     -       Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
+     -       have a 1:1 majority requirement.
 
    For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
    votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
    Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
 
+   The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and arrange that failing a
+   supermajority voids the whole decision (or makes it advisory),
+   rather than promoting another option.  The fencepost bugfix will
+   also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions
+   requiring supermajorities.  And after this change the TC chair can
+   choose a non-default option even if it is tied with a default
+   option.
+
    ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----