+++ /dev/null
-
-2. It is not practical for the TC to vote to accept/reject individual
- amendments to the GR proposal. The TC would wish to delegate its
- power to accept amendments, to avoid needing the collection of
- sponsors for uncontroversial changes. However the Secretary has
- advised that this is not constitutionally acceptable.
-
- Therefore, to achieve roughly the same effect, the TC makes the
- following promise. If any TC member gives notice that the TC
- accepts an amendment, then at least one of the following will
- happen:
-
- (a) the TC will use its own power under A.1(1) to arrange that
- the amendment appears on the GR ballot as an option;
-
- (b) the TC will use its power under A.1(1) to propose and
- its power under A.1(2) to accept the amendment, so that
- the amendment is incorporated in the version voted on; or
-
- (c) A member of the TC will publicly notify the amendment's
- proposer that the amendment will not be accepted after all.
- In this case TC will wait at least 7 more days before calling
- for a vote, to give time for the amendment's proposer to
- collect sponsors.
-
-===== TC RESOLUTION ENDS =====
+++ /dev/null
-===== TC RESOLUTION STARTS =====
-
-1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
- 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
- General Resolution:
-
- ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
-
- Constitutional Amendment: Permit TC to hold informal private conversations
-
- On a number of occasions recently, enquirers have emailed TC
- members' personal addreses to informally seek members' views. This
- has worked well; however it is not clear that Constitution permits
- it. This situation should be regularised.
-
- On occasion the TC has been asked to decide on maintainership of
- packages. It is very difficult to hold the necessary discussions,
- which inevitably involve discussion of personalities, in public.
-
- At the moment the TC is unable to take on a mediation role, since
- mediation necessarily involves each party to a dispute conversing
- privately with the mediator. The TC should be able to mediate if
- the TC, and parties to a dispute, wish it to do so.
-
- Actual decisionmaking must still place in public of course.
-
- Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution 6.3 as follows (wdiff -i):
-
- 3. Public [-discussion and-] decision-making.
-
- [-Discussion,-]
- Draft resolutions and amendments, and votes by members of the
- committee, are made public on the Technical Committee public
- discussion list. There is no separate secretary for the
- Committee.
-
- [+<cite>The Technical Committee should limit private
- discussions to situations where holding the conversation in
- public would be infeasible or counterproductive.</cite>+]
-
- ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
+++ /dev/null
-===== TC RESOLUTION STARTS =====
-
-1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
- 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
- General Resolution:
-
- ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
-
- Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering.
-
- The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1.
- This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is
- undesirable.
-
- Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment:
-
- - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0.
-
- ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
+++ /dev/null
-=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===
-
-1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in 4.2(1)
- of the Debian Constitution to propose a General Resolution,
- and according to A.1(1) the TC also proposes an amendment.
-
- The proposed texts of the two resulting options for the General
- Resolution are as follows:
-
- ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS, COMMON INTRODUCTORY TEXT -----
-
- Advice to the TC on overruling maintainers
-
- In the past the Technical Committee have been reluctant to overrule
- a maintainer unless all the members are absolutely convinced that
- the maintainer's decision was wrong.
-
- The TC has sought the views of the Developers. Accordingly, the
- Developers advise, in their (non-binding) opinion, that:
-
- ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION OPTION A -----
-
- The Technical Committee's approach so far has been correct.
-
- ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION OPTION B -----
-
- Technical Committee members should be willing to vote to overrule if
- they feel that the maintainer's decision was wrong; the
- supermajority requirement is sufficient to guard against overruling
- in questionable cases.
-
- ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
-
--- /dev/null
+===== TC RESOLUTION STARTS =====
+
+1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
+ 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
+ General Resolution:
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
+
+ Constitutional Amendment: Permit TC to hold informal private conversations
+
+ On a number of occasions recently, enquirers have emailed TC
+ members' personal addreses to informally seek members' views. This
+ has worked well; however it is not clear that Constitution permits
+ it. This situation should be regularised.
+
+ On occasion the TC has been asked to decide on maintainership of
+ packages. It is very difficult to hold the necessary discussions,
+ which inevitably involve discussion of personalities, in public.
+
+ At the moment the TC is unable to take on a mediation role, since
+ mediation necessarily involves each party to a dispute conversing
+ privately with the mediator. The TC should be able to mediate if
+ the TC, and parties to a dispute, wish it to do so.
+
+ Actual decisionmaking must still place in public of course.
+
+ Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution 6.3 as follows (wdiff -i):
+
+ 3. Public [-discussion and-] decision-making.
+
+ [-Discussion,-]
+ Draft resolutions and amendments, and votes by members of the
+ committee, are made public on the Technical Committee public
+ discussion list. There is no separate secretary for the
+ Committee.
+
+ [+<cite>The Technical Committee should limit private
+ discussions to situations where holding the conversation in
+ public would be infeasible or counterproductive.</cite>+]
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
--- /dev/null
+===== TC RESOLUTION STARTS =====
+
+1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
+ 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
+ General Resolution:
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
+
+ Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering.
+
+ The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1.
+ This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is
+ undesirable.
+
+ Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment:
+
+ - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0.
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
--- /dev/null
+=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===
+
+1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in 4.2(1)
+ of the Debian Constitution to propose a General Resolution,
+ and according to A.1(1) the TC also proposes an amendment.
+
+ The proposed texts of the two resulting options for the General
+ Resolution are as follows:
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS, COMMON INTRODUCTORY TEXT -----
+
+ Advice to the TC on overruling maintainers
+
+ In the past the Technical Committee have been reluctant to overrule
+ a maintainer unless all the members are absolutely convinced that
+ the maintainer's decision was wrong.
+
+ The TC has sought the views of the Developers. Accordingly, the
+ Developers advise, in their (non-binding) opinion, that:
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION OPTION A -----
+
+ The Technical Committee's approach so far has been correct.
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION OPTION B -----
+
+ Technical Committee members should be willing to vote to overrule if
+ they feel that the maintainer's decision was wrong; the
+ supermajority requirement is sufficient to guard against overruling
+ in questionable cases.
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
+
--- /dev/null
+=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===
+
+1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
+ 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
+ General Resolution:
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
+
+ Constitutional Amendment- TC Supermajority Fix
+
+ Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
+ Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.
+
+ Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a
+ fencepost error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met
+ only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly
+ greater than the supermajority ratio.
+
+ In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
+ developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
+ dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
+ dissenters could be overruled by all 6 remaining members; now that
+ is no longer possible.
+
+ This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
+ of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
+
+ Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows:
+
+ (i) Replace "majority" with "supermajority" everywhere a ratio
+ other than 1:1 is specified. That is, in
+ 4.1(2) -- Developers' power to amend the Constitution
+ 4.1(4) -- Developers' power to overrule the TC
+ 4.1(5)(3) -- Developers' power to amend Foundation Documents
+ 6.1(4) -- TC's power to overrule a Developer (both occurrences)
+ replace the word "majority" with "supermajority".
+
+ (ii) In A.6(3):
+
+ 3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default
+ option by its required majority ratio is dropped from
+ consideration.
+ 1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
+ who prefer option A over option B.
+ - 2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
+ - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
+ - 3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
+ - ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
+ + 2. An option A defeats the default option D by its
+ + required majority ratio if both:
+ + (a) V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A); and
+ + (b) if a supermajority of N:M is required for A,
+ + M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to N * V(D,A).
+
+ (iii) In A.3(2) "Voting procedure", delete as follows:
+ 2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
+ - Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
+ - have a 1:1 majority requirement.
+
+ The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and make the wording
+ consistent, by always referring to "supermajorities" where
+ applicable. A 1:1 vote will need strictly more in favour than
+ against, but an N:1 vote will need only exactly N:1. This will
+ also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions
+ requiring supermajorities.
+
+ For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
+ votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
+ Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
+
+ ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
+++ /dev/null
-=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===
-
-1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
- 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
- General Resolution:
-
- ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
-
- Constitutional Amendment- TC Supermajority Fix
-
- Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
- Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.
-
- Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a
- fencepost error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met
- only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly
- greater than the supermajority ratio.
-
- In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
- developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
- dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
- dissenters could be overruled by all 6 remaining members; now that
- is no longer possible.
-
- This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
- of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
-
- Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows:
-
- (i) Replace "majority" with "supermajority" everywhere a ratio
- other than 1:1 is specified. That is, in
- 4.1(2) -- Developers' power to amend the Constitution
- 4.1(4) -- Developers' power to overrule the TC
- 4.1(5)(3) -- Developers' power to amend Foundation Documents
- 6.1(4) -- TC's power to overrule a Developer (both occurrences)
- replace the word "majority" with "supermajority".
-
- (ii) In A.6(3):
-
- 3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default
- option by its required majority ratio is dropped from
- consideration.
- 1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
- who prefer option A over option B.
- - 2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
- - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
- - 3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
- - ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
- + 2. An option A defeats the default option D by its
- + required majority ratio if both:
- + (a) V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A); and
- + (b) if a supermajority of N:M is required for A,
- + M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to N * V(D,A).
-
- (iii) In A.3(2) "Voting procedure", delete as follows:
- 2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
- - Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
- - have a 1:1 majority requirement.
-
- The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and make the wording
- consistent, by always referring to "supermajorities" where
- applicable. A 1:1 vote will need strictly more in favour than
- against, but an N:1 vote will need only exactly N:1. This will
- also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions
- requiring supermajorities.
-
- For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
- votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
- Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
-
- ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
--- /dev/null
+
+2. It is not practical for the TC to vote to accept/reject individual
+ amendments to the GR proposal. The TC would wish to delegate its
+ power to accept amendments, to avoid needing the collection of
+ sponsors for uncontroversial changes. However the Secretary has
+ advised that this is not constitutionally acceptable.
+
+ Therefore, to achieve roughly the same effect, the TC makes the
+ following promise. If any TC member gives notice that the TC
+ accepts an amendment, then at least one of the following will
+ happen:
+
+ (a) the TC will use its own power under A.1(1) to arrange that
+ the amendment appears on the GR ballot as an option;
+
+ (b) the TC will use its power under A.1(1) to propose and
+ its power under A.1(2) to accept the amendment, so that
+ the amendment is incorporated in the version voted on; or
+
+ (c) A member of the TC will publicly notify the amendment's
+ proposer that the amendment will not be accepted after all.
+ In this case TC will wait at least 7 more days before calling
+ for a vote, to give time for the amendment's proposer to
+ collect sponsors.
+
+===== TC RESOLUTION ENDS =====
projects / debian-ctte.git / commitdiff